German nuclear facility as a gateway for Russia?

German nuclear facility as a gateway for Russia: Why politicians must stop Rosatom’s plans in Lingen.

By Vladimir Slivyak

In Lingen, Lower Saxony, fuel elements for Russian-designed nuclear power plants are set to be produced in future in collaboration with the Russian state-owned company Rosatom. This would create new dependencies and give Russia access to critical infrastructure, warns our guest writer.
2026 is the year of commemoration of the two greatest nuclear disasters of mankind: the fifteenth anniversary of the Fukushima disaster and next Sunday, the 26th April, is the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Both events showed to the world how quickly nuclear hazards which threaten the environment and societies can spread across national borders. All the more fatal was the appearance of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in mid-March at a nuclear energy summit in Paris, at which she spoke out in favor of a nuclear renaissance in Europe.
It was striking that one word was missing from her speech: Russia. In 2024 alone, EU nuclear power plant operators imported 15 percent of their uranium from Russia. Last year, France alone introduced 39 percent of its enriched uranium from Russia. Against the background of this structural dependence on Russia, the desire for a “Renaissance” is a serious strategic mistake.
To see this, one need only look to Lingen in Lower Saxony. The French nuclear company Framatome plans to expand its fuel assembly production facility there to manufacture fuel rods for Russian VVER reactors across Eastern Europe. To this end, it wishes to cooperate with TVEL, a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned nuclear group Rosatom. The decision on approval formally lies with the Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, but in practice the German government also has considerable influence, as the federal states carry out nuclear regulatory oversight on its behalf and it can issue instructions where necessary.
Approval of this project would integrate Rosatom into the Western nuclear infrastructure – at precisely the moment when Europe is striving to reduce its decades-long dependence on Russian energy imports. The project is fatally reminiscent of Germany’s handling of Nord Stream I and II or the sale of German gas storage facilities to Gazprom. These cooperation projects, too – which, by the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the latest, had proved to be far-reaching political misjudgements – began in a supposedly innocuous manner.
For decades, I have observed how Russia has repeatedly gained access to critical infrastructure abroad in precisely this manner. At the outset of such deals with Russia, everything always sounds like a perfectly normal, rational economic partnership. The partners usually pay the geostrategic price much later. Framatome insists that no Russian personnel will work in Lingen as part of the cooperation – a bold claim. TVEL reactors require TVEL engineers. Plants developed in Russia cannot be maintained without Russian specialists, just as reactors from the Soviet era in the EU are still serviced by Rosatom personnel.
Yet the presence of Russian engineers in Lingen is not a calculable risk that simply needs to be managed somehow. Anyone who allows this is opening the door to highly critical infrastructure for the Russian secret service, the FSB. FSB agents are an integral part of Rosatom’s business dealings. The notion that routine maintenance visits could take place without personnel with links to the FSB is therefore naïve.
The clearest evidence of Rosatom’s true nature can be seen in Ukraine. When Russian troops occupied Zaporizhzhia, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, Rosatom staff were present. Ukrainian workers were arrested, and operations were placed under Russian control. Rosatom was involved from the outset and took over management of the nuclear power plant on Russia’s behalf. Furthermore, Rosatom is a key part of Russian arms manufacturing. The Washington Post reported early on after the war began how Rosatom was supplying sanctioned Russian arms manufacturers with high-tech components being used in the war against Ukraine. A company so deeply entangled in a war of aggression that violates international law must not be a partner to Western companies.
There is one question that is asked far too rarely: why would Rosatom agree to a deal like the one in Lingen at all? Fuel rod manufacturing is a lucrative technology that gives Russia influence over all European countries operating VVER reactors. Sharing this technology with a Western competitor makes no economic sense. Unless, of course, it is not just about economic interests, but about access itself. When Russian state actors make an offer that accepts such follow-on costs, one should therefore prick up one’s ears.
European security researchers have documented how state-sponsored actors from Russia, including the ‘Dragonfly’ and ‘Energetic Bear’ groups, have spent years stealing energy technology from Western firms through cyberattacks. A physical presence at a facility such as Lingen is incomparably more valuable. Personnel can install sensors, map supply chains, identify vulnerabilities and establish contacts that, over time, become a means of exerting pressure. Once this system is established, it is extremely difficult to dismantle. That is the real objective. Rosatom’s presence could certainly not be ended by simply terminating the contract.
Germany, of all countries, should finally recognise this approach, particularly in view of the looming threat of massive dependence on a regime hostile to us. For years, Nord Stream was promoted using the very same arguments now being used for Lingen: pragmatism, mutual interest, economic necessity. Critics were accused of being ideological; trade, it was claimed, created stability. Then Russia used gas as a weapon, and since then Germany has been learning, through a painful, protracted and, above all, costly process, what strategic vulnerability actually costs.
The arguments put forward today in favour of Lingen are almost word for word the same as those once put forward for Nord Stream. The Lingen project carries the same risk – this time, however, in a sector that is even more sensitive and, above all, more dangerous than pipelines. Having worked hard for several years to reduce dependence on Russian energy, the German government should think carefully about whether it now seriously wishes to grant Rosatom and FSB agents access to a nuclear fuel facility on German soil.
If we take a broader view, Europe’s responsibility also becomes clear. Before nuclear euphoria breaks out again on the continent and the supposed – and, from a purely economic perspective, unjustified – renaissance of nuclear power is conjured up, it is imperative to examine what systematic dependencies on Russia this would create – at a time of maximum estrangement.
Lingen is an important test of whether Germany and the EU have learnt the right lessons from recent years. Whether the ‘turning point’ has truly taken root in the minds of decision-makers. Berlin must block this project. In the past, the full extent to which cooperation with Russia jeopardises European security may initially have been difficult to recognise. In the case of Lingen, there is absolutely no doubt about it.

First published at: https://table.media/berlin/tablestandpunkt/deutsche-atomanlage-als-einfallstor-fuer-russland-warum-die-politik-rosatoms-plaene-in-lingen-unterbinden-muss

Vladimir Slivyak is co-founder and co-chair of the Russian environmental organisation Ecodefense and a recipient of the Right Livelihood Award.